It has been argued that consensus on the responsibility to protect (R2P) was lost in the UN Security Council as a result of the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011. This argument assumes that there was more agreement on R2P before the Libyan intervention than there was afterwards. Yet a close examination of the Security Council's use of language on R2P shows the opposite: R2P was highly contentious within the Security Council prior to the Libyan intervention, and less so afterwards. Not only has the Council used R2P language more frequently since 2011, but also negotiating this language has become quicker and easier. To demonstrate this I compare negotiations on Darfur with deliberations during and after the Arab Spring. Resolution 1706 on Darfur was the first time the Security Council referred to R2P in a country-specific resolution -and indeed it was the only country-specific resolution to refer to R2P before 2011 -making it an apt point of comparison. Via focused analysis on how the language used in Security Council resolution evolves over time, this article demonstrates that the Council has found 'agreed language' on R2P that is acceptable to members, both for thematic resolutions and country-specific resolutions. Language on R2P in Security Council resolutions has shifted from contentious to commonplace.
authorised the no-fly zone, have provoked intense debate in the years that followed.
Significantly, Resolution 1973 marked the first time the Security Council authorised the non-consensual use of force for the protection of civilians against a functioning state (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 825; Glanville, 2013: 325) . Given this, it represents a decisive example of implementing the coercive aspects of the responsibility to protect (R2P). The outcome of regime change in Libya has opened up debates over the implementation of R2P.
Many have argued that there has been a backlash against R2P after the Libyan intervention. For example, Gareth Evans argued that 'consensus fell away ' after Libya (2012) . Likewise, Ramesh Thakur has said that the international consensus on R2P has been damaged by the Libyan intervention (2013: 72) . Graham Cronogue took this a step further and argued 'The legacy of NATO's overreach in Libya will make Russia and China extremely hesitant to approve the Responsibility to Protect in the future ' (2012: 151) . While NATO's actions in Libya, particularly on regime change, have been contentious these arguments assume that there was more consensus on R2P in the Security Council before the Arab Spring than there was afterwards. Some have challenged this argument by showing that the Security Council used R2P in resolutions more often in the two years after Libya than it had used it prior to 2011 (Bellamy, 2014: 26; Weiss, 2014: 10) . Frequent use of R2P language is part of the change, but the ease and speed with which R2P language has been included in Council resolutions since Libya also represents a significant shift.
To demonstrate the depth of this change, this article draws on the case of Darfur.
Libyan Resolution 1970 was the second country-specific resolution to include language on R2P, while Darfur Resolution 1706 was the first. It took six months to negotiate Resolution 1706 on Darfur in 2006, and language on R2P proved to be one of the most difficult aspects. The following year, there was insufficient agreement to refer to R2P again in a resolution on Darfur, and this language was removed from an early draft. This contrasts strongly with the period from 2011 onwards, beginning with Libya, where the Council has routinely included language on R2P in resolutions. These negotiations have been quick and language on R2P has not been a major obstacle in the negotiations.
Language on R2P has become more acceptable to Security Council members over time, and the Libyan resolutions in 2011 mark the turning point.
This article focuses on the way language on R2P has been used in Security Council resolutions and how it has changed over time. Resolutions are the strongest form of decision the Security Council makes, and can be legally binding, but this article analyses the politics of drafting resolutions rather than their legal effects.
ii While there is literature which discusses the language of specific Council resolutions, there have been few sustained studies on the language in Security Council resolutions more broadly.
iii To analyse the politics of language in Security Council negotiations -and R2P language more specifically -this article proceeds in two parts. The first section discusses the significance of language within the Security Council, which can be resistant to innovation, but new language can become routinized over time. The second section takes a chronological approach to the Security Council's use of language on R2P in resolutions, divided into three phases of the Council's engagement with R2P: from the early stages of R2P in 2001 to 2006; 2007-2010 when R2P was rarely cited; and 2011-2014 with regular language on R2P from the Libyan resolutions onwards. In doing so I show that language on R2P was highly divisive and rarely used by the Council until 2011, and it has been used more frequently since and negotiations have been easier and quicker.
Security Council negotiations and language
The factors involved in individual Security Council decisions are myriad, so to evidence change we should look for broader trends in how the Council engages with situations of mass atrocity crimes (Bellamy, 2015: 98-102) . Looking at shifts in language is one way to show these broader trends. As argued by Fierke, rather than asking whether language is important in international politics, we should ask how and why language is important (2002: 331 and 351). There are three key reasons why language used in Security Council resolutions is important to the process of decision-making: language is not static and evolves as shared understandings change; the wording of resolutions informs future resolutions; and repetition of language is a form of reaffirmation. This section unpacks the implications of these three aspects of decision-making, before turning to language on R2P more specifically.
First, the interpretation and use of language in the Security Council is not static and reflects a negotiated balance of what was acceptable to members at a particular moment in time. The very scope of the Council's mandate -to maintain international peace and security -has been interpreted and reinterpreted over time, expanding the Council's work into new areas (Yamashita, 2007) . Resolution 688 on Iraq in 1991, for example, represented an evolution in the Council's practice by determining that the transboundary effects of internal repression could constitute a threat to international peace and security (Wheeler, 2000: 139-171 Council for this evolution to occur (Stromseth, 1993: 86-88) . The language in resolutions therefore represents a 'snapshot' showing the political compromise that was widely supported by Security Council members at a given point in time.
Second, drafting resolutions is both political and routine: innovation in language can be intensely political, and yet repeated language can become routine over time. Use of language on the protection of civilians illustrates this pattern of behaviour. As explained by Holt et al, language on the protection of 'civilians under imminent threat of physical violence' was originally negotiated for a peacekeeping mandate in Sierra Leone in 1999 and was carefully caveated as Council members recognised the precedent effects of this innovation. Since then however, it has become standard phrasing in peacekeeping mandates for different conflicts (2009: 36-47) . This is because Security Council members value 'previously agreed language' as it is easier to find agreement on language which states have accepted in the past (Author Interview, 2011b; Dunne and Gifkins, 2011: 523) . The language used in previous resolutions becomes the starting point for future negotiations. Indeed, as Neumann (2007) argues, the language used in foreign policy decision-making has a particular inertia and tendency towards repetition. (Welsh, 2013: 378) .
In the case of R2P this will not lead to automaticity in the way the Council responds to crises, given the case-by-case nature of the R2P agreement and the political nature of the Council (on this see Brown, 2003; Welsh, 2013) . However, framing situations in relation to R2P helps promote the 'responsibility to consider' how best to respond to mass atrocity crimes, which Welsh shows is a key strength of R2P (emphasis in original 2013: 368). R2P has become a 'commonly accepted frame of reference' within international politics through which states consider their responses to mass atrocity crimes (Bellamy, 2011b: 1). Regular inclusion of R2P language in Security Council resolutions demonstrates that R2P is a regular feature of the internal negotiations within the Council. While R2P advocates clearly recognise that R2P will only ever be one aspect of the Council's decision-making (Bellamy, 2015: 72; Welsh, 2013; 387-389 ) the regular inclusion of R2P within the Council's internal deliberations and resolutions shows that
Council members are considering their responses within the remit of R2P.
R2P in Security Council resolutions
The UN Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, so resolutions regularly include language on the responsibilities of parties to a conflict and on the protection needs of populations. Given this, we need a way to ascertain when the Security Council is referring to the 'responsibility to protect' populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanityas outlined at the 2005 World Summit -and when they are discussing broader protection responsibilities. Similar to Morris (2013 Morris ( : 1267 Second, in the statements after the vote for Resolution 1564 one Security Council member, the Philippines, clearly invoked language from the ICISS report in their statement (Williams and Bellamy, 2005: 27) . Echoing the ICISS report, the Ambassador to the Philippines said 'A State has the responsibility to protect its citizens, and, if it is unable or unwilling to do so, the international community -the Security Council -has the moral and legal authority to enable that State to assume that responsibility' (UN, after the World Summit can be explicitly linked to the agreed meaning of R2P, so Table   1 shows uses of R2P in resolutions from the World Summit until the end of 2014. R2P was highly disputed in Resolution 1706 and took six months to find agreement, even then with abstentions from China, Qatar, and Russia. Indeed, a participant involved in these negotiations said that R2P was the most contentious part of Resolution 1706 (Author Interview, 2011c) . Although it represented the first time a country-specific resolution had included R2P, it has been described as one of the 'worst Security Council resolutions ever' as it mandated legally binding peacekeeping, but
could not be implemented (Lynch, 2010) . The legacy of this resolution is significant then, as it increased the difficulty of using R2P language in later resolutions.
R2P in the background: 2007-2010
Following from these experiences, the Security Council was reluctant to refer to R2P This negotiation illustrates how difficult it was for the Security Council to include language on R2P during this period. Indeed, supporters of R2P within the Council were working from the assumption that it was better not to reopen debate on R2P in the Council at this time (Security Council Report, 2007) . This level of difficulty was also reflected in Resolution 1814 on Somalia in 2008, which referred to thematic Resolution 1674, but without an explicit link to R2P (Strauss, 2009: 305) . Thus, the period from 2007-2010 was characterised by resistance to R2P language from some Council members, and supporters of R2P accepted the political sensitivities of the time.
Libya and beyond: 2011-2014
The period from 2011 to 2014 has seen a dramatic increase in usage of language on R2P by the Security Council (see Table 1 ). During this period the Security Council has referred to R2P in country-specific resolutions on Libya, Cote d'Ivoire, South Sudan, Yemen, Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic and Syria. It has also been cited in thematic resolutions on small arms and light weapons, genocide, the prevention of armed conflict, and peacekeeping operations. While it has been suggested that the Security Council became more sceptical of R2P after NATO's intervention in Libya, in fact
Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya mark the turning point where the Council began to refer to R2P regularly in relation to specific conflicts. Indeed, as noted by Bellamy 'the Security Council has proven more willing to use RtoP in relation to specific situations than it was prior to Libya...Rather than running from a delegitimised RtoP, the Council has embraced the principle post-Libya as it never had before ' (2014: 39) . In this period the Security Council has referred to R2P more regularly in relation to both specific conflicts and thematic issues.
It is not simply the frequency of R2P in Security Council resolutions that is striking; it is also the comparative ease with which language on R2P is included.
Resolutions 1674 Sudan's primary responsibility to protect -was negotiated in less than two weeks with relative ease (Security Council Report, 2013b). Likewise, Resolution 2139 which referred to the Syrian government's responsibility to protect, took two weeks of negotiations. There was some resistance from Russia on including R2P language in relation to Syria (Security Council Report, 2014a), but the language on R2P remained in the resolution and Russia voted affirmatively without expressing any concern about R2P in its statement after the vote (UN, 2014a). Using R2P language in relation to specific cases became easier and quicker during this period.
The pattern of both ease and speed is reflected in thematic resolutions as well.
The text for the first resolution on small arms and light weapons was drafted in less than three weeks. Security Council Report noted that 'Council members differed on a number of issues along traditional dividing lines' including R2P, but language on women peace and security was more challenging in these negotiations than R2P (2013a). Likewise, suggested that this link may be somewhat spurious as Russia has been 'inconsistent at best' in linking these two cases and Russia had expressed similar concerns over international coercion in earlier cases of Kosovo and Darfur (2014: 26 and 31) . Russia also voted affirmatively for some subsequent resolutions on Syria which contained similar R2P language, suggesting that the language of R2P was not the determining factor (see Table 1 ).
On Libya, there has been considerable academic discussion on the 'pillar one' language in Resolutions 1970 and 1973 which were framed as the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect (UN, 2011d; 2011e) rather than as 'pillar three' international responsibilities (see for example Hehir, 2016) . The use of 'pillar one' language led
Nossal to claim that 'neither resolution invoked the Responsibility to Protect doctrine' (2013: 117). Drawing from the 'pillar one' language in the Libyan resolutions, some have argued that R2P is still too controversial for states (Hehir, 2013; Morris, 2013) .
Analysing patterns in the Security Council's use of R2P language -particularly in relation to the pillars -I discuss below what can be learnt about the current standing of the concept, from thematic resolutions, country-specific resolutions and voting patterns. language have referred to the states' responsibility to protect. This chronology suggests that the use of R2P language was 'set back' by its association with Resolution 1706 on
Darfur, but has since become acceptable to refer to R2P in country-specific resolutions, particularly in the form of 'pillar one'.
Third, voting patterns demonstrate that R2P language has become a broadly accepted practice for Security Council members (see Table 1 language does not counter general voting trends (Dunne and Gifkins, 2012: 523) . This demonstrates that Security Council members -from all regions -are generally willing to support resolutions which include language on R2P. The three resolutions with abstentions are also telling. These were on Darfur, on Libya and on small arms and light weapons. As highlighted, Resolution 1706 on Darfur authorised a consent-based peacekeeping operation, for which there was no consent and it could not be implemented.
Resolution 1973 on Libya authorised a non-consensual no-fly zone. These two are unique in Table 1 as resolutions where consent was a key issue. Given this, it is not surprising that the Council members who abstained on these resolutions highlighted the issue of consent (on Darfur) and pragmatic questions around the use of force (on Libya) (UN, 2006c; UN, 2011a) . Unsurprisingly, issues in relation to consent and the use of force in specific crises remain the most challenging areas to find agreement (for discussion see Morris, 2016; Quinton-Brown, 2013) . Similarly, Russia explained its abstention from the resolution on small arms and light weapons in pragmatic terms -that it wanted a provision condemning the supply of arms to non-state actors (UN, 2013: 4-5) . This shows that there remain pragmatic questions for Security Council members on how best to implement R2P, particularly in relation to specific crises.
Analysis of these three areas -thematic resolutions, country-specific resolutions, and voting patterns -reveals a nuanced position on the acceptability of R2P for states.
Since 2011 
Conclusion
Language on R2P in Security Council resolutions has shifted from contentious to commonplace. Unlike the argument that consensus was 'lost' after the Libyan intervention, analysis of the language in Security Council resolutions shows that it became markedly easier to reference R2P after 2011 than it was before. There was intense political debate and negotiation around R2P language when it represented an innovation in the Council's use of language, but this has settled over time as acceptable 'agreed language' has been found for both thematic and country-specific resolutions. Since 2011, R2P has been regularly reaffirmed in a wide array of conflicts and thematic issues, and these drafts have become quicker and easier to negotiate. Patterns have emerged in R2P language, with thematic resolutions regularly citing both national and international responsibilities, and country-specific resolutions focusing on the language of national responsibilities. As the early negotiations highlight however, including any language on and it is accepted practice to reaffirm R2P regularly, both on national and international responsibilities. These changes indicate that the early resistance to evolution in this language has given way and R2P has settled into 'agree language' which Council members are willing to accept and regularly reaffirm.
The language in Security Council resolutions -in addition to 'insider' reports obtained from interviews, from Security Council Report, and via WikiLeaks -shows that R2P was highly contentious but over time has become a regular feature of the internal deliberations within the Security Council. While this article has focused on resolutions, it is worth noting that the same pattern holds for presidential statements made by the Security Council. The Council has used R2P in presidential statements more regularly from 2011, both in statements on specific countries and in statements on thematic issues iii Notable exceptions to this are Wood (1998) which discusses how to interpret the language used in Security Council resolutions; and Holt et al (2009) which analyses the evolution of language on the protection of civilians. iv Although Neumann's analysis is primarily in relation to drafting speeches for the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, he argues that his analysis is congruent with other the drafting processes for other foreign policy documents and in other country contexts. v Here I mean 'precedent' in a political sense rather than a legal sense. The Security Council is a political body and members choose to use previously agreed language, without legal obligation. vi I have excluded from analysis distinct language which is tied to the connected but distinct agendas on the Protection of Civilians and on Women Peace and Security, which use the phrases 'protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence' and 'parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to ensure the protection of affected civilians' respectively. vii Additionally, between 2001 and 2005 there were eight Security Council resolutions on the conflict within Georgia which used the phrase 'responsibility to protect returnees'. The use of this phrase stopped after the 2005 World Summit, however like others, I have not found any evidence to link this language to the ICISS version of R2P (Chesterman, 2011: 2-3 
